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Preface
 My honors thesis topic was the result of a primary focus of history and politics during my 
academic tenure at James Madison. Entering college, I had already developed a strong interest in 
political history. This interest stemmed from my childhood experiences growing up in Arlington, 
only a few miles from Capitol hill. Living in Arlington, where neighboring families are lawyers, 
lobbyists, and members of Congress themselves, I have always been completely engulfed in the 
political system and broader political culture inside the beltway. Researching and writing an 
honors thesis on a political topic was a natural extension of my community ties and my own 
personal interests.  
 My thesis topic of the agency and authority of the Speaker of the House evolved from a 
rough idea to a final working concept quite quickly. My recent areas of study during my third 
year of college had focused on twentieth-century political history from the Great Depression to 
the early nineteen-seventies. Taking these courses as inspiration, I knew that a topic in recent 
political history would be valuable, informative, and above all, feasible.  
 The next step in developing my thesis was choosing a time period on which to focus. I 
quickly realized, however, that focusing on a single time period would not accurately reflect the 
nature of the speakership and its changing roles and responsibilities over time from the early 
republic to the modern era. Therefore, I decided to identify important, pivotal moments during 
the historical development of the speakership. Focusing on major events thorough the history of 
the speakership also served to ground my thesis and dictate a clear, efficient, and well-organized 
structure for the final paper.
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The subject of my history 395 paper was the Iran-Contra affair, which was my first major foray 
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the confidence to enroll in the class despite my preliminary lack of enthusiasm for the subject 
material. Although I had doubts, the class ended up changing my perspective and expanded my 
knowledge of the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, Professor Hyser was gracious enough to 
allow my younger brother to attend his class to gain a better understanding of how college 
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Chapter One: The Origin of the American Speakership 
The U.S Speakership 
 From the early Republic to modern times, the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
has been the single greatest source of legislative authority within the United States government. 
Often considered the second-highest ranking U.S official after the President, the Speaker utilizes 
the distinct tools at their disposal to guide the entire legislative process towards the direction they 
desire. Broadly, these tools include the ability to set the legislative agenda, control debate, and 
appoint committee chairs. However, the vastly complex set of rules, guidelines, and procedures 
which govern the modern House were simply not present when Congress first met in 1789. The 
formal and informal establishment of House procedures took over a century to refine and devel-
op into what is now a highly regimented network almost entirely controlled by the majority par-
ty.  
 Over time, the agency wielded by the Speaker has varied considerably. A component of 
this variation can be attributed to the various leadership styles and personalities of the individuals 
who have held the office. From the inception of the speakership to the present, there has been a 
historic trend toward decentralization and power-sharing among members of the House, which 
has strikingly diminished the overall power of the Speaker. During the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the Speaker wielded a near-ultimate command over the entire House, and the Speaker 
was able to enact legislation without either the broad support or coalition-building required of the 
modern Speaker.  
 The origins of the Speaker of the House of Representatives are rooted in parliamentary 
procedure from European constitutional monarchies, especially Great Britain. The Founders in-
 !4
cluded a formal leadership position within the text of the Constitution, known as the Speaker, to 
govern the chamber and preside as the highest-ranking formal officer. The Speaker is mentioned 
in the last line of Article I, Section II, and is the only formal role with the power to govern the 
House named in the Constitution.  1
The Roots of the American Speakership 
 The Speaker of the House of Representatives has been a traditional seat of power since 
the formation of the United States. There are several major influences that shaped the formation 
of the American speakership. These include the development of the British speakership, colonial 
legislative history, and the authority of the President of the former Continental Congress. The 
origins of the American speakership, as with many U.S institutions, can be traced to the leader of 
the English legislative body. The term Speaker was first used in the thirteenth century to describe 
the head of the House of Commons, the lower house of English Parliament. When the word 
“speaker” first emerged to describe the leader of the House of Commons, the British monarch 
filled the position by appointment. Thus, most Speakers served with deference to the political 
agenda of the Crown, and the legislative history of the era demonstrated this subservience, as 
frequently laws supported the will of the monarchy. The Speaker acted as an agent of the crown 
to enact the will of the monarch through the House of Commons. The practice of monarchical 
appointment changed with a series of incremental reforms in the fourteenth century, in which the 
House of Commons was granted the ability to choose its own Speaker. However, as a check to 
 Mary Parker Follet, The Speaker of the United States House of Representatives (New York: Lennox Hill 1
Publishing, 1974), 5-15; Hubert Bruce Fuller, The Speakers of the House (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1909), 3-22; Jeffery A. Jenkins and Charles Stewart III, Fighting for the Speakership: The 
House and the Rise of Party Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 6-17. 
 !5
this new independence, the monarch held a veto power which effectively limited the House of 
Commons from choosing a Speaker in direct opposition to the monarch.  2
 The evolution of the British Speakership took the greatest leap forward during the seven-
teenth century in a period of political tumult when the position evolved from a direct voice of the 
monarch to a status independent of the Crown’s political agenda. This era saw the greatest ex-
pansion of authority for the Speakership, as the fallout from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 
consequently placed Parliament on higher authoritative ground than the monarch for the first 
time in the history of Britain. With this new authority, the British Speakership developed into its 
modern form as a nonpartisan office with administrative responsibilities.  3
 It is clear that the British Speakership was the parliamentary bedrock on which the Amer-
ican Founders based the speakership. American colonial political history also influenced the de-
cision to dedicate the Speakership as an official position incorporated in the Constitution.  
English colonists established the first permanent political institutions in the New World in the 
form of government legislatures. A leader, often called a “speaker”, guided these early assem-
blies. Major authority and decision-making power was vested in these early colonial speakers, 
and the leaders became well-known to the people among the colonies.  4
 The American Founders also drew upon the President of the Continental Congress as a 
model in determining a formal leadership position in the new U.S legislature. The President of 
the Continental Congress was a ceremonial position without tangible political power, and was 
 Follett, The Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, 7. 2
 Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: 3
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 3-13. 
 Follett, The Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, 15. 4
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determined through an election involving all Continental Congress delegates. The Founders in-
corporated the administrative powers of the President of the Continental Congress into the new 
role of Speaker of the House of Representatives as a presiding officer designed to facilitate de-
bate. However, the President of the Continental Congress only served as an initial model for the 
speakership, as subsequent Speakers of the House wielded far more political power than any 
President of the Continental Congress.  
 The history of the British speakership, colonial legislatures, and the President of the Con-
tinental Congress were all positions that informed the Founders’ decision to create the American 
speakership. Individual components of these three distinct entities were combined into one posi-
tion formally titled the Speaker of the House of Representatives and enshrined in the U.S Consti-
tution. The role of the parliamentarian administrator was central to these historical leadership 
positions, and therefore became the most significant element of the early American speakership. 
While the American speakership later evolved into its own unique position within the party gov-
ernment system, it is rooted in British, colonial, and early American history.  5
 The Early Speakership 
 The First United States Congress met from March 4, 1789 to March 4, 1791 in three ses-
sions. The first two sessions met at Federal Hall in New York City, and the third session met at 
Congress Hall in Philadelphia. At the start of the first session of Congress, and without any for-
mal set of guidelines in place, the early legislators began their new occupations by deciding on 
the first Speaker. The most favorable candidate was Frederick Muhlenburg of Pennsylvania, a 
former Lutheran pastor who was part of the former Pennsylvania delegation to the Continental 
 Fuller, The Speakers of the House, 33-40. 5
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Congress. Most critical to Muhlenburg’s appeal was his background as a Pennsylvanian. The im-
plementation of the new U.S Constitution brought immediate changes to every aspect of gov-
ernment, and there was a concerted effort to represent all of the most powerful individual states 
in the new federal government. With President George Washington representing Virginia and 
Vice President John Adams representing Massachusetts, a representative from Pennsylvania was 
a natural fit for the first Speaker of the House.  6
 Speaker Muhlenburg was elected in an uncontested election at the beginning of the new 
legislative session of the First Congress. The organization of the House in the first Congress un-
der Speaker Muhlenburg primarily employed two distinct forms of legislative committees, which 
served as the primary vehicle for legislation. The first were ad-hoc committees. They were 
formed with the specific purpose of administration over particular issues and problems facing 
members of the House of Representatives. The ad-hoc committees were both the first governing 
structure and the most problematic due to their informal nature. When any sort of major or minor 
issue arose in these sessions of Congress, the issue would be directed to an ad-hoc committee 
that was formed to solve that specific issue.   7
 New committees were formed constantly to deal with different, specific issues relating to 
individual members of Congress and their districts. For example, a tax dispute involving local 
agriculture practices in Virginia would be sent to an informal committee with a single representa-
tive. In practice, these committees were simply poorly constructed avenues for individual repre-
sentatives to claim ownership over a specific policy areas, and were cumbersome and unwieldy. 
 Jenkins, Fighting for the Speakership, 22-37. 6
 Peters, The American Speakership, 44. 7
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An individual representative in this early period of the U.S Congress was often the sole member 
of tens of different ad-hoc committees, working individually to write and form legislation to 
solve regional conflicts. Overall, the ad-hoc system resulted in inefficient government that was 
unable to efficiently legislative multiple issues concurrently.   8
 The second form of legislative committees was the Committee of the Whole. This is 
when all members of the House of Representatives sit on the same committee to conduct legisla-
tive business, and is still used today in modern Congressional parliamentary procedures. Em-
ploying the Committee of the Whole structure was common in the early period of the U.S Con-
gress and facilitated discussion among all representatives in the House. While the Committee of 
the Whole advanced egalitarianism among representatives, it conversely allowed for a majority 
of politically aligned members of Congress to effectively silence any opinions held by the minor-
ity of representatives.   9
 The Speaker of the House of the early Republic was viewed as a notable influencer in the 
legislative process, rather than being widely recognized as a politically authoritative figure. The 
use of the Committee of the Whole is an example of the broad control the Speaker was pre-
scribed over the House chamber. The Speaker organized each legislative session into the Com-
mittee of the Whole and chaired the overall debate during the committee. However, the first 
Speakers of the House were more parliamentarian figures who perceived their role as a facilitator 
 Follet, The Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, 22. 8
 Jenkins, Fighting for the Speakership, 25. 9
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of debate. This differs from contemporary Speakers who effectively control each legislative insti-
tution with the purpose of advancing their own political agendas.  10
 The modern Congressional institutions that govern the House of Representatives and fa-
cilitate the legislative process were not simply fully-formed structures that have been in place 
since the beginning of Congress. Rather, the most central components of governance over the 
House evolved from the single position of the Speaker of the House before emanating outward to 
include committee structure, leadership authority, and the general legislative process. The work 
of Congress to pass legislation, however, in the decades after the House first convened indicated 
there was no formal procedure guiding the legislative process. While Congress was able to func-
tion overall, its activities were convoluted, repetitive, and impractical. This changed, however, 
with the formal creation of standing committees.   11
New Legislative Institutions  
 Formal committee structure in the U.S House of Representatives did not emerge until the 
late eighteenth century with the establishment of the first standing committee known as the 
committee on Ways and Means on December 21, 1795. The House Ways and Means committee 
was formed as an assertion of political power in response to the tax policy being carried out by 
Federalists in the Department of the Treasury. Congress, controlled by the Republican Anti-Fed-
eralists, formed the House committee on Ways and Means in an effort to defend Congressional 
 Peters, The American Speakership, 53. 10
 Jenkins, Fighting for the Speakership, 30. 11
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interests and stymie the executive branch of government from enacting conflicting fiscal poli-
cies.  12
 Major committee developments soon followed the establishment of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, as Congressional leaders saw the committee as a valuable institution and ve-
hicle for efficient legislative action. Within the next Congress there were several major commit-
tees that corresponded to major and topical policy groups, collectively known as standing com-
mittees. Together, these standing committees began to form the basis for the development of leg-
islation and quickly outmoded the need of the less-efficient and cumbersome debates that ensued 
from employing the Committee on the Whole. 
 The formation of these new political institutions changed the agency of the Speaker of the 
House from one rooted in parliamentarian tasks such as calling role and facilitating discussion to 
an actively partisan political office. Before the formation of standing committees, there were few 
tangible methods at the Speaker’s disposal available to directly shape policy outcomes. The 
Speaker was able to wield influence and expertise to the legislative process, however, the Speak-
er was relatively limited because the House often employed the egalitarian Committee of the 
Whole. The agency of the Speaker changed dynamically once a permanent standing committee 
structure was put in place. Now, the Speaker had the authority to direct committee assignments 
and how legislation proposed in committees would be introduced to the full body of the House of 
Representatives for voting purposes.  13
 Follett, The Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, 15. 12
 Peters, The American Speakership, 63-65.13
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 The implementation and evolution of the committee structure of the House of Represen-
tatives closely tracked new developments in the partisanship expressed by the Speaker of the 
House for political gain. As the number of standing committees grew and the system evolved 
into permanence, the Speakership changed to include not only exercising formal parliamentary 
power, but also exercising informal political power. This meant that the Speaker, as a party agent, 
determined the chairs of each standing committee in an effort to directly influence the policy de-
bate.  14
A Changing Speakership During Political Gridlock 
 The evolution of Speakers serving an egalitarian, parliamentary function to Speakers 
serving in a directly partisan manner manifested most clearly in the aftermath of the Civil War. 
Starting in the 39th Congress and continuing forward, the gradual evolutionary changes of the 
early Republic cemented into government inextricably controlled by political parties. In the party 
government system beginning in the late 1860’s, the majority party ruled the House completely 
and unconditionally. The organizational and political control that the Speaker began to utilize 
resulted in increasingly formal House voting procedures. For example, the Speaker, and their 
party by extension, controlled how and when to vote on specific bills. Furthermore, committee 
chairs would determine if the bills ever left their respective committees to go to a full vote on the 
House floor, and the Speaker and party leadership determined the sequence in which bills were 
voted on.   15
 Peters, The American Speakership, 65. 14
 Fuller, The Speakers of the House, 47-55. 15
 !12
 Party control over the House began with the Republican Party in the United States post-
Civil War. The Republican Party, the party of President Lincoln, stood for federal unity in an in-
creasingly divided nation and constituted much of the North and Northeast of the United States. 
The Democratic Party of this period was a political party in favor of states’ rights and local au-
tonomy, with a center of power in the southern regions of the United States. Together, the Repub-
licans and Democrats constituted the two major parties of the late nineteenth century.  
 During the 1860’s to 1900, the House majority frequently turned over between the Re-
publican and Democratic parties. Whichever party was in the majority was able to effectively 
steamroll the minority party to advance their own legislative agenda, with a few notable excep-
tions. The dramatic shift in the Speakership to partisan tactics from a previously parliamentary 
role led to an uprising by the House minority party who began to effectively block majority-party 
legislative goals.  16
 The minority party, in an effort to stymie the majority, began to employ obstructionist 
parliamentary tactics to their advantage. These efforts included taking advantage of roll-call 
votes and using disappearing quorums. Roll-call votes is a part of parliamentary procedure where 
a member of the House staff calls the name of every member of Congress and notes if they are 
present in the chamber. While the 40th through 50th Congresses had fewer than the 435 modern 
representatives, there were still hundreds of names to call and account for. The role-call vote 
process was long and cumbersome, and through forcing a roll-call vote the minority party had 
the temporary means to stall the legislative proceedings.   17
 Peters, The American Speakership, 53.16
 Peters, The American Speakership, 65. 17
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 Another unique facet to the roll-call vote tactic, which became especially relevant to later 
sessions of Congress, involved representatives refusing to answer when their name was called, 
thereby forcing the House administrators to mark their attendance as absent even though they 
were visibly present inside the House chamber. This insidious tactic was a low blow to the ruling 
majority party, and considered disrespectful to the legislative process. However, both parties still 
employed these tactics when they fell into the minority during the late nineteenth century.  
 Another tool at the minority party's disposal was the use of disappearing quorums. A quo-
rum in the House is the number of members of Congress required to be present in order to con-
duct official business, including preliminary and final votes on bills. Without a quorum, the ma-
jority party is unable to effectively pass legislation because not enough representatives are 
present in order to do so. In the 1860’s and 1870’s, this tactic proved effective at limiting control 
over the majority party because neither party was ever in control of a large enough majority to 
have both a majority and a quorum.   18
 The political gridlock of the late nineteenth century was problematic for effective gov-
ernment administration, especially considering the economic upheaval brought upon by rapid 
post-war industrialization and the dire need of legislative action to accommodate these broad 
shifts in the American economy. However, the closely divided House of Representatives and di-
vergent policy interests of the Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats made legislating 
effectively impossible. This political gridlock was especially evident during the 51st Congress, 
 Follett, The Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, 76-82. 18
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from March 4, 1889 to March 4, 1891, in which Republicans narrowly controlled both the House 
and Senate, and the executive under President Benjamin Harrison.   19
Speaker Thomas Reed and the Reed Reforms 
 The Speaker of the House during the 51st Congress was the infamous Thomas Brackett 
Reed, a U.S representative from Maine and powerful figure in the Republican Party. Reed as-
cended to the Speakership after successfully outmaneuvering his rival and future President 
William McKinley for leadership of the House. Thomas Reed was Speaker from December 4, 
1889 to March 3, 1891, and then again from December 2, 1895 to March 3, 1899 when Republi-
cans regained control of the House of Representatives. Standing at over 6 feet tall and weighing 
over 300 pounds, Thomas Reed was a huge man by modern standards, and was viewed as a giant 
during his own period as leader of the House. Reed’s enormous size enabled him to tower over 
his political opponents and throughout his tenure as Speaker he was known to use his size for 
purposes of intimidation.  20
 Speaker Reed is one of the most well-known Speakers of the House for implementing 
revolutionary reforms to parliamentary procedure and general voting practices known collective-
ly as the Reed Rules. The Reed Rules were a Republican-led response to the quagmire and polit-
ical gridlock facing Congress in the late 1800’s, and effectively outlined a new governing philos-
ophy championed by Speaker Reed. The implementation of these new parliamentary rules was 
facilitated by several major voting indigents that saw the last opportunities for obstruction by the 
House minority stripped away. In their place, the new Reed Rules allowed for a more functional 
 Fuller, The Speakers of the House, 47-55. 19
 Peters, The American Speakership, 63. 20
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House of Representatives governed entirely by the philosophy that the majority party rules the 
House completely and totally.  
 The 51st Congress saw Republicans gain control of the House with a slim seven-vote ma-
jority over the opposing Democrats. The closely divided chamber allowed for the minority De-
mocrats to employ various obstructionist tactics, including both the roll-call vote and the disap-
pearing quorum. While Democrats believed that they had an advantage  using these tools, Speak-
er Reed began to enact a political plot which would see the Republican Party gain total and com-
plete control over the House within the first year of the 51st Congress. The plan began with a 
contested House seat, continued with the implementation of the so-called Reed Rules, and con-
cluded with one of the single most productive legislative period in the post-Civil War United 
States.   21
The Political Drama Reaches a Zenith 
 Speaker Reed’s plot to quash the Democratic minority’s obstructionist tactics began with 
a controversy over the inclusion of a newly elected representative from West Virginia named 
Charles Brooks Smith, who was selected in a special election to fill the seat’s vacancy. Represen-
tative Smith was a Republican, and in order to be considered an official voting member of Con-
gress he had to be formally accepted by the rest of the House through a vote. The controversy 
centered around the interpretation of the roll-call vote tactic of obstructing the majority party’s 
legislative agenda. In previous legislative practice, the roll-call vote was employed to obstruct 
voting on a bill when a representative whose name was called in the roll-call would simply 
refuse to answer to their name, despite being visibly present in the House chamber. This tactic 
 Fuller, The Speakers of the House, 33-40. 21
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would end the process because it prevented the passage of the actual motion to vote on which-
ever bill was under consideration.   22
 The first implantation of the Reed Rules reforms started when a formal role-call vote was 
called for by the Democratic minority on January 19, 1890.  The Democrats then proceeded to 23
use the roll-call vote to obstruct the consideration of the Republican representative Charles 
Brooks Smith as a formal voting member of the House. When the names of the representatives 
were totaled with those who replied to the roll-call vote, all Republicans, the 161 voting aye for 
the consideration of the bill did not reach the minimum required for a quorum. Stepping in, 
Speaker Reed began an adroitly choreographed legislative dance. First, Speaker Reed, as the 
Chair, directed the House Clerk to record the names of members present and refusing to vote. 
This indicated to the entire chamber that the Speaker intended to move forward with the vote and 
consider the silent Democrats to constitute a quorum, a clear and decisive break from past formal 
legislative procedure.  24
 Immediately, verbal appeals were made from the Democratic representatives whose 
names were called without their consent. One of the most vocal representatives was William 
Campbell Preston Breckinridge from Kentucky, a member of a political family and the cousin of 
the Vice President John Breckinridge. Breckinridge bellowed out on the House floor “I deny the 
power of the Speaker and denounce it as revolutionary!” Other Democratic representatives 
quickly applauded and soon the House floor was alive with one of the most raucous and heated 
 Jenkins, Fighting for the Speakership, 269. 22
 Peters, 6523
 Follett, The Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, 90. 24
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debates of the nineteenth century. Soon after Breckinridge’s inflamed remarks, another represen-
tative from the Kentucky delegation named James Bennet McCreary screamed at Speaker Reed 
“I deny your right, Mr. Speaker, to count me as present, and I desire to read from the parliamen-
tary law on that subject!” The next portion of the exchange was heard throughout the entire 
chamber, as Speaker Reed lashed back to the representative by saying “The Chair is making a 
statement of the fact that the gentlemen from Kentucky is present. Does he deny it?” Speaker 
Reed’s remarks drew immediate laughter followed by heavy applause from the Republican side 
of the aisle, and was successfully able to embarrass the Democratic representatives. With his in-
tentions made absolutely clear, Speaker Reed silenced the minority Democrats and proceeded 
with his legislative agenda regarding the new West Virginia representative Charles Smith.  25
 This incident marked the first of several altercations between the majority and minority 
during Thomas Reed’s tenure as Speaker of the House, and is significant because of the far-
reaching parliamentary implications to Speaker Reed’s reforms. The successful, if not inflamed, 
debate on January 19, 1890 sparked Speaker Reed to move forward with additional components 
of parliamentary reform. With the assistance of the Republican coalition in Congress, Speaker 
Reed changed the House rules to reduce the quorum requirement in the Committee of the Whole 
to 100 members, empower the Chair to count quorum as he saw fit, and enable the majority to 
rule generally unobstructed.  26
 While Speaker Reed had a clear political motive for implementing his drastic reforms to 
legislative procedure in the House of Representatives, there was also a broader ideological com-
 Peters, The American Speakership, 64.25
 Peters, The American Speakership, 65. 26
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ponent involved. Speaker Reed’s political philosophy played a significant role in informing his 
decision-making process, including how to pursue parliamentary reform. Overall, Speaker Reed 
firmly believed in the idea of majority rule, which in his view advanced the principles of democ-
ratic government.   27
The Reed Rules Guide Success  
 These large-scale changes were seen as drastic at the time; however, the Reed Rules ulti-
mately led to one of the greatest periods of legislative productivity in the history of the House of 
Representatives. During the 51st Congress and after Speaker Reed’s adroit implementation of the 
Reed Rules, the House of Representatives passed 611 bills. This was the largest number in a sin-
gle session of Congress to that point in history, and included famous legislation including the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the McKinley Tariff Act, and the Oklahoma Territories Act. In the face 
of rapid economic growth, modernization, and industrialization, the United States was able to 
effectively legislate and solve domestic obstacles because of Speaker Reed’s leadership in im-
plementing the Reed Rules.   28
 The early history of the Speakership, dating back to British influence and colonial legisla-
tures, marked a period of formal parliamentary influence without concrete legislative authority. 
This relatively powerless and weak form of the Speakership lasted until after the Civil War, when 
a clear rise in the Speaker’s partisan agency can be seen. This rise in the power of the Speaker-
ship grew most dramatically during Thomas Reed’s Speakership in the 1890’s, when the implan-
 Follett, The Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, 77-85. 27
 Peters, The American Speakership, 69. 28
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tation of the Reed Rules fundamentally changed the nature of the House and established the 
principle of true majority rule.  
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Chapter Two: The Speakership and Concentrated Political Authority 
The Committee Structure  
 The American speakership in the early Republic was a formal, administrative position 
that was solely concerned with parliamentary procedure and administration. The first Speakers 
did not wield independent authority, but instead were simple parliamentarians who presided over 
the debate among other members of the House. However, a significant and notable shift occurred 
in the late nineteenth century when Speaker Thomas Reed seized additional authority to guide 
the overall lawmaking system and advanced a partisan legislative agenda. Speaker Reed set a 
precedent for subsequent House leaders, who continued the same approach and leveraged politi-
cal agency to further their party’s political goals. This pattern of increasing the Speaker’s authori-
ty reached its height during the early twentieth century.  
 The committee system is the most fundamental component of general Congressional op-
erations, and slowly evolved to become central to the everyday workings of Congress during the 
late nineteenth century. Congressional committees were small, manageable groups of representa-
tives that were organized around a central policy focus to develop, critique, and ultimately intro-
duce legislation to the entire House. While there are a variety of different committees to deal 
with policies ranging from agriculture to infrastructure, three central committees emerged to be-
come the most important and influential: the committee on Ways and Means, the committee on 
Appropriations, and the committee on Rules. These major committees constitute the central 
powers of the legislative branch, and are the three most powerful committees in the House.  1
 “Committee on Ways and Means” United States House of Representatives, accessed November 30, 1
2016, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/about. 
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 The committee on Ways and Means was the first permanent standing committee created 
in the House, and was formed to provide an avenue for the discussion of all taxation and gov-
ernment revenue-generation matters pertaining to the United States government. The committee 
was established on December 21, 1795, and was the first committee to emerge after the ad-hoc 
committee structure was abolished in favor of formal standing committees. Due to its general 
jurisdiction and pertinence to a wide variety of issues, the Ways and Means committee is known 
as the most prestigious committee in the House.   2
 The committee on Appropriations was formed to centralize all spending bills and legisla-
tion requiring the expenditure of government resources. This committee traces its origins to the 
committee on Ways and Means, which was split into three separate committees via a House reso-
lution on December 11, 1865. The former committee on Ways and Means became one of three 
new committees, and retained its original jurisdiction over taxation. The other two new commit-
tees were the committee on Banking and Commerce, and the committee on Appropriations. The 
committee on Banking and Commerce was formed to have jurisdiction over financial regulatory 
matters, while the committee on Appropriations was formed to have complete control over all 
spending affairs.  3
 The final, most significant House committee is the committee on Rules. The committee 
on Rules is unique because it does not specialize in a specific policy area. Instead, the committee 
on Rules creates the parliamentary procedures that govern debate in the House. The committee 
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on Rules, by determining the fashion in which bills are introduced and voted upon, constitutes 
the primary means in which the ruling party exercises its command over the chamber as the ma-
jority power.  
 All Congressional committees are led by an individual, or chair, who is the highest com-
mittee-level authority. The committee chair is uniquely powerful because they determine whether 
bills introduced in committee advance to the House floor for the next stages of the legislative 
process, including debate and final vote. The individual serving as committee chair is responsible 
for spearheading the development of legislation, and is therefore expected to have a complete 
understanding of the policy area of the committee on which they serve.   4
Implementing Parliamentary Reform 
 The implementation of the Reed Rules set into motion a new era in which the Speaker 
wielded unprecedented political agency. After the standing committee structure was institutional-
ized, all members of Congress voted by ballot to select committee chairs. This process quickly 
became cumbersome, and soon the power to determine committee chairs was vested to the 
Speaker. While the Speaker had the overall power of appointment, a broad base of bipartisan 
support within the chamber was still required to make committee chair appointments. However, 
the Reed Rules further streamlined and concentrated the appointment power into the sole juris-
diction of the Speaker and eliminated the requirement for broad support and general agreement.  5
 In the wake of the Reed Rules, the appointment power came to be a valuable tool which 
the Speaker utilized to influence lawmaking. The Speaker could shape the overall policy process 
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by appointing party loyalists and political allies who were able to effectively execute the Speak-
er’s legislative agenda. For example, as the most important committees in the House, Speaker 
Reed appointed his closest and most trusted political allies to chair the committee on Ways and 
Means, the committee on Appropriations, and the committee on Rules. Republican management 
of the House was so tightly coordinated and controlled that Speaker Reed gained the derogatory 
nickname “Czar Reed,” which exasperated Democrats coined because they had no effective leg-
islative input as the minority party.  
 The implementation of parliamentary reform in the 1880’s and 1890’s and subsequent 
practice of majority rule enabled the rise of the most formidable and dominating Speaker of the 
House in American history – Joseph Cannon. Speaker Cannon served four terms as Speaker from 
1903 to 1911, and was known for his style of authoritarian control over the House chamber. This 
commanding leadership style brought Speaker Cannon obedience from Republicans and scorn 
from Democrats, while fostering frustration in both parties. As Speaker, Cannon appointed pow-
erful allies to all major congressional committees, cementing his rule over the House. However, a 
series of historic events which transpired in March 1910 ultimately led to Speaker Cannon’s po-
litical demise and a dramatic reconfiguration of the role of the Speaker. 
The Rise of Speaker “Uncle Joe” Cannon 
 Joseph Cannon was first elected to Congress in 1873 and represented a district that en-
compassed Danville, Illinois, near the Indiana border. Throughout his political career, Cannon 
was known for his unique charisma and personal qualities. This included his diminutive stature, a 
thick Midwestern accent, and speech characterized by colloquialisms and often profane lan-
guage. While Cannon was significantly below average in height, he was an extremely talkative 
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man who delivered long, rambling stump speeches. To compensate for his small and slender 
stature, Cannon moved constantly as he spoke, often in a hyperactive, borderline manic fashion. 
These attributes, combined with his tendency to speak in vulgar and sexually explicit language, 
contributed to his overall public image as a common Midwestern man and earned him the nick-
name Uncle Joe Cannon, a moniker that followed him throughout his political career.  This nick-
name was a term of endearment which stemmed from the fact that he was a relatable and likable 
individual.   6
 As a junior Republican member of Congress, Cannon followed in the tradition of Abra-
ham Lincoln and strongly believed the power of the federal government superseded that of the 
states. When he was first establishing himself as a political figure, Cannon found it politically 
advantageous to emulate Lincoln, due to Lincoln’s continued popularity within the Republican 
Party and with constituents in his Illinois district. While both Cannon and Lincoln were former 
lawyers who practiced law in Illinois, there were few genuine similarities between the two men. 
Unlike President Lincoln, when faced with major political quagmires, Cannon most often fa-
vored a distinctly conservative approach and did not consider changes to the status quo. Howev-
er, Cannon successfully leveraged his similarities to Lincoln into electoral victory and sustained 
popularity in his district.   7
 The earliest and most significant political connection Cannon formed as a junior Con-
gressman was an alliance with Speaker Thomas Reed. Cannon quickly entered into the ranks of 
Reed’s trusted allies, and was a leading architect of the Reed Rules and subsequent legislative 
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reforms. Although Cannon had successfully won re-election to Congress a total of eight times 
before 1890, he was not known on the national stage until his assistance in implementing the par-
liamentary reforms under Speaker Reed. As a close party ally and personal friend of Speaker 
Reed, Cannon was granted chairmanship of the prestigious and influential House committee on 
Appropriations. This chairmanship was the first major leadership position that Cannon held, and 
his tenure as chair helped gain him the notoriety and popularity required to form the coalition of 
allies required to be elected Speaker.   8
 Uncle Joe Cannon attempted to become Speaker of the House four times before he was 
ultimately successful during the middle session of the 58th Congress. The path to Speaker was an 
informal, closed-door process in which the most well-known members of the majority party 
would put their names forward to be considered for the speakership. Cannon’s previous attempts 
were starkly ambitious and ill-received considering his youth, inexperience, and lack of political 
résumé. However, Cannon was able to burnish his political reputation after Speaker Reed ap-
pointed him chair of the committee on Appropriations.    9
 As chair of the committee on Appropriations during the 51st, 55th, 56th and 57th Congress-
es, Cannon effectively held the federal government’s purse in his own pocket. This enviable po-
sition saw Cannon in charge of the appropriation of all government resources, which meant that 
Cannon held power over great numbers of federal bureaucrats vying for government funding. As 
a conniving and fearless leader, Cannon was able to leverage his chairmanship to exact further 
influence over both other components of the federal government and the rest of the House. Can-
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non’s duration as chair of the committee on Appropriations delivered the experience and authori-
ty necessary to successfully compete for Speaker of the House.   10
 Uncle Joe Cannon was selected Speaker of the House on November 7, 1903. The speak-
ership was determined after several rounds of closed-door negotiations, which eliminated other 
influential Republican leaders from the contest. Finally, the entire Republican caucus, as the ma-
jority party in power, formally elected Cannon as Speaker. The process was entirely partisan and 
did not leave Democrats with any voice in the decision-making process.  The vote was not close, 
and Cannon had no serious challengers.   11
 Speaker Cannon’s early alliance with former Speaker Reed greatly influenced his politi-
cal ascension. However, it was immediately clear that major differences in governing style exist-
ed which separate the two politicians. Cannon exploited the role of Speaker further by often si-
lencing both majority and minority opinions on legislative matters, in an effort to advance his 
own personal legislative agenda. The implementation of Reed Rules changed parliamentary pro-
cedure to facilitate efficient rule by the House majority, ushering in an era of unprecedented leg-
islative productivity led by Speaker Reed. Speaker Cannon, however, was an exceedingly con-
servative man who did not believe in change from the status quo. These ideological differences 
between Republican speakers became increasingly clear during Joseph Cannon’s tenure as 
Speaker of the House.  
Joseph Cannon’s Political Beginnings 
 Cannon did not serve as Chair of the Appropriations committee during the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Con10 -
gresses because Democrats were in the majority then. 
 Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, 72.11
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 The political landscape at the turn of the twentieth century was centered around the com-
peting ideologies of the Republican and Democratic parties. However, during this historical peri-
od a combination of factors determined voting on key issues rather than simply party affiliation. 
Bitter partisanship marked the earlier Gilded Age, when party loyalty was the most important 
factor when voting on legislation. Instead, in the Progressive Era, there were a variety of oppor-
tunities for members of Congress to vote out-of-step with their party. These voting opportunities 
generally overlapped with constituency-specific public policy issues, many of which stemmed 
from the burgeoning Progressive movement. 
 The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw a period of comprehensive 
and dramatic changes to the foundation of everyday American life. Central to this change was the 
movement of Americans from rural communities to sprawling urban centers in search of new 
economic opportunities. The spending power of the American consumer rose as new innovations 
in transportation, communication, and agricultural technology improved everyday quality of life. 
However, not all of these changes were viewed as positive. The growing concentration of power 
and influence among several leading corporations became a major concern of the progressives. 
Overall, these monumental shifts in American society spawned debate over the power and influ-
ence of big business and the need for government regulation of industry.    12
 Joseph Cannon’s own personal ideology was strongly rooted in the notion of free enter-
prise and market-driven economic policy. Cannon’s own experience of growing up in rural Illi-
nois, where increasing agricultural production, protecting land rights, and developing small busi-
nesses were among the greatest concerns helped cement Cannon’s economic values. While other 
 Peters, The American Speakership, 50.12
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regions of the nation were forced to grapple with the issues of sanitation in cities, food adulter-
ation, and pollution, the constituency Cannon represented did not face any similar problems. 
Cannon’s limited worldview as a representative from a rural, agricultural-based region informed 
his plain lack of interest in advancing solutions to the problems produced by the growth of indus-
try that alarmed so many other Americans.  13
 Speaker Cannon used his authoritarian leadership style to stymie progress on any legisla-
tion he deemed in conflict with his ideology towards business and regulation. While Speaker 
Reed facilitated majority rule by reforming the quorum, thereby laying the groundwork for mod-
ern legislative governance, the core foundation of consensus-building and compromise between 
parties in the House was still both intact and necessary for legislative goals to come to fruition. 
However, Speaker Cannon changed House rules even further to silence the minority entirely. 
This concentration of political authority, wielded through committee appointments and changes 
to floor debate, effectively shut down any remaining avenues for the minority to voice opposi-
tion.  14
Speaker Cannon and the Partisan Speakership 
 The most important political mechanism at Speaker Cannon’s disposal was control over 
the House Rules committee, which Cannon chaired in addition to his role as Speaker. Cannon 
first gained experience on the House Rules committee when Speaker John Carlisle (D,KY) ap-
pointed him to serve as a young representative. While there was a Democratic majority during 
this period and the Republicans had little control over the committee’s policy decisions, Cannon 
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was exposed to party politics and the unique capabilities of the rules committee in the legislative 
process. There are several key components to the power of the Rules committee. The committee 
has the sole authority to determine whether or not a bill, after being proposed and written in an-
other policy-based committee, would be brought to the House floor for preliminary debate. Addi-
tionally, the rules committee is responsible for implementing the individual guidelines that gov-
ern both the debate and amendment procedures regarding a specific bill. Speaker Cannon utilized 
the power of the rules committee, in combination with his influence as Speaker, to effectively 
manage the entire legislative process. Consequently, Speaker Cannon used this authority to pre-
vent legislation outside of his own social or economic values from being enacted.  15
 The source of Cannon’s political legitimacy as speaker rested with the Republican cau-
cus’s majority. These were the members of Congress who first elected him to serve as speaker in 
1903, and continued to support him during most of his tenure as the leader of the House. Howev-
er, there were several decisive factors which began to build upon one another and ultimately lead 
to a historic political revolt which stripped Cannon of his major political powers in 1910. The 
first factor was the growing tension in the relationship between Speaker Cannon and President 
Theodore Roosevelt. Additionally, the lack of legislative productivity and overall success of 
Speaker Cannon’s leadership became a factor in his swift political end. The largest factor which 
cemented Cannon’s political downturn was the dramatic growth in the number of ideologically 
progressive members of Congress who fundamentally opposed Speaker Cannon’s dually conser-
vative and authoritarian leadership. This authoritarian leadership was derisively known as “Can-
 Speaker Carlisle served as the 31st Speaker of the House from 1883 to 1891.15
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nonism”, and was the greatest criticism during Cannon’s tenure as speaker.   The 16
fate of the president’s legislative agenda depends on the capability and inclination of the Speaker, 
and the political marriage between President Theodore Roosevelt and Speaker Joseph Cannon 
was no different. President Roosevelt was a liberal Republican who identified with the Progres-
sive movement while in office from 1901 to 1909, and he championed legislation to improve the 
quality of life for everyday Americans. However, President Roosevelt and Speaker Cannon rep-
resented opposite ends of the Republican Party. While Roosevelt was a true progressive leader 
who saw the regulation of industry as necessary and imperative, Speaker Cannon fundamentally 
disagreed. The relationship that Roosevelt and Cannon shared was considerably strained as the 
two politicians clashed over the Republican legislative agenda. Cannon, as a strict conservative, 
was opposed to many of the reformist policies that Roosevelt began to champion as a Progres-
sive Republican.   17
 Speaker Cannon’s policy achievements were modest at best. The greatest social policy 
change of Cannon’s tenure was the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. After the 
revelation of unsanitary conditions at meat packaging plants exposed by Upton Sinclair’s The 
Jungle in February 1906, the U.S Congress took immediate action by subsequently passing the 
Pure Food and Drug Act only four months later in June. This was the first bill of its kind, be-
cause prior to passage there had been no major regulation of the food production industry, and a 
major legislative accomplishment for progressive Republicans and Democrats. The members of 
Congress who represented urban constituencies benefited the most because the unique problems 
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the bill sought to remedy, including food adulteration and quality control, disproportionately af-
fected cities.    18
 The success of this bill was an example of Cannon breaking from his personal ideology 
to appease the progressive Congressional faction. Cannon himself did not personally agree with 
the new regulations of the food industry. Most of all, Cannon opposed the provision that required 
companies to bear the cost of new inspection standards. Ultimately, this political compromise is 
an example of the growing power of the Progressive movement in the early twentieth century.  19
 The rise of the progressive movement quickly grew from an annoyance to a long-term 
political threat for Speaker Cannon, whose own ideology staunchly supported the status quo, and 
wholly antithetical to the philosophy espoused by the burgeoning political power of the progres-
sives. The members of Congress who began to vocally oppose Speaker Cannon and his authority 
as leader of the House became known as the “insurgents.” These members were progressive Re-
publicans and Democrats who together supported the removal of Cannon as Speaker.  The dicta20 -
torial and uncompromising nature of Cannonism bred resentment within both the Democratic 
minority and within the ruling Republican party. Furthermore, the style of leadership that Can-
non embodied was despised as anti-Democratic, tyrannical, and even called unpatriotic.   21
The Political Rebellion Begins   
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 The inception of the movement to curb Cannon’s power as speaker began immediately 
after Cannon assumed office as the leader of the House. The main source of discontentment was 
within the minority Democratic Party and did not constitute any form of serious threat to Can-
non’s political rule. However, the Progressive movement changed the political calculus in favor 
of the insurgents by gradually adding moderate Republicans into the coalition to curb Cannon’s 
authority.  
 The plot to strip Cannon of his essential authority and terminate the practice of Cannon-
ism emerged as Cannon’s leadership grew more and more authoritarian. Many of the insurgent 
Republicans had organized secret meetings to discuss how to effectively curb Cannon’s rule. 
These discussions came to a head on March 17, 1910, when the effort to curb the power of 
Speaker Cannon manifested into a full-scale revolt that permanently and fundamentally changed 
the role of the speakership.   22
 The 1910 revolt was a complex political maneuver that took the form of a resolution from 
Congressman George Norris (R) of Nebraska. The original resolution proposed to modify the 
House rules to change the composition of the Rules committee to fifteen members total, granting 
nine seats to the majority party and six seats to the minority party. The most integral provision of 
the proposed resolution was to make the Speaker ineligible for membership on the Rules com-
mittee. Later versions of the resolution reduced membership on the rules committee from fifteen 
to ten, with six majority-party representatives and four minority-party representatives.   23
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 Congressman George Norris was one of the key architects of the 1910 revolt and was one 
of the leaders of the so-called Congressional insurgents. Norris knew that he and his group of 
insurgents would have little time before Cannon would take notice of their plot to curb his out-
size influence on all matters of House policy. Thursday, March 17, 1910 was a scheduled day for 
Congress to be in session, however, it was also St. Patrick’s Day. Most of the Republican tradi-
tionalists who supported Cannon had taken the day off to celebrate the holiday in their districts, 
and were noticeably absent from the House floor. This left the Republican and Democratic coali-
tion which opposed Speaker Cannon’s authority an opportune moment to begin their revolt. The 
determination to move on St. Patrick’s Day was a keen strategy, and not only because were a ma-
jority of Cannon’s political allies away from the Capitol. Cannon, although still physically 
present in the House chamber on March 17, was caught completely off-guard by proposed reso-
lution and was entirely unsuspecting of the forthcoming insurgent’s plot against him.  24
 Cannon’s lack of political wits in this circumstance became apparent in the afternoon of 
Thursday, March 17, when Norris’s resolution was originally introduced. In the parliamentary 
procedure of the early twentieth century House, a motion to introduce a resolution must be grant-
ed by the chair, which is most often the presiding Speaker. One of the few exceptions to this 
standard procedure is if a member of Congress declares their motion “privileged”. The highest-
ranking “privileged” motion is the declaration that the motion is “privileged under the Constitu-
tion.” When a member of Congress makes this declaration, their motion supersedes all others and 
the question on whether or not to allow the motion is put to an immediate vote by the members 
present in the House chamber. Additionally, in these circumstances there is no qualification a 
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motion must meet in order to be considered privileged under the Constitution other than general 
consent of the other members present. If a member of Congress desires to have their bill privi-
leged, they simply declare it so and it is either accepted or rejected by the majority body.   25
 Congressman Norris knew that Speaker Cannon identified him as a political rival and a 
chief insurgent, so it was unlikely that Cannon would directly rule in his favor if he brought up a 
traditional motion to introduce a resolution. Therefore, in a display of political expertise, Norris 
declared his motion to introduce a resolution privileged under the Constitution, which was ac-
cepted by the insurgent members of Congress currently present. With his motion to introduce a 
resolution granted, Norris then dropped the equivalent of a political bomb by announcing his 
resolution to both change the membership of the House Rules committee to be more balanced 
between Democrats and Republicans while also stripping Cannon of his own membership on the 
committee.   26
The Pinnacle of Congressional Drama  
 In a single instant, the entire House began to awaken with a newfound intensity when it 
realized an intense partisan struggle was imminent. Speaker Cannon’s first reaction was to send 
word to his ally Republican members of Congress who were away to return to the Capitol imme-
diately, in an effort to muster the number of votes needed to stop the insurgents’ revolt. This ma-
neuver did not help Cannon in the immediate period after the introduction of the Norris resolu-
tion, however. As per the operating rules of parliamentary procedure, a period of debate over 
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whether to adopt the resolution began after its initial introduction to the full House. The at-
mosphere in the House quickly became intensely competitive and lost all sense of traditional 
formal cordiality.   27
 After Norris introduced the resolution, a series of fierce debates between the Cannon 
supporters and the coalition of Democratic and Republican insurgents lasted well into the late 
evening of Thursday, March 17and early morning of Friday, March 18, 1910. Congressmen from 
either side of the conflict exchanged scathing insults, jabs, and political blows at one another 
over the contention that Speaker Cannon was a tyrannical figure who had lost his right to lead 
the House. Cannon himself was flummoxed by the surprise revolt, which took him genuinely off-
guard. He did not take swift action to prevent the revolt from gaining progress, which was out of 
character for the seasoned politician. Instead, Cannon determined that the best strategy was to 
wait as long as possible until his missing political allies could rejoin the House debates and tip 
the scales back in his favor.   28
 The initial debate over the Norris amendment lasted for 26 hours. Finally, at 5:30 AM on 
Friday March 18, a majority consensus was reached to table the resolution until Saturday. There 
was hope that a settlement could be reached during this window of time, however, no significant 
progress was made as both the Cannon supporters and detractors firmly held their ground with-
out compromise. Speaker Cannon, sensing that he was about to lose this major political battle 
over a fundamental power of his office, used the time to draft a speech which he planned to de-
liver when the debate resumed on Saturday. This speech would become one of the highlights of 
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Cannon’s political career and gain him additional notoriety for his adroit political 
gamesmanship.   29
 Finally, at noon on Saturday, March 19, debate continued over the adoption of the Norris 
resolution. In its final form, the Norris resolution provided for a ten-person House Rules commit-
tee, six members from the majority party and four members from the minority party, with the 
Republican and Democratic caucuses determining membership.  The resolution proposed the 30
Speaker to be formally excluded from the Rules committee, and the committee members would 
determine the chair. At the start of debate, the Norris resolution as amended was presented for a 
final vote, which carried with a vote count of 191 to 156. The successful passage of the Norris 
amendment ended the House revolt with a comprehensive victory by the insurgents, who suc-
cessfully defeated Cannon and his allies by stripping the Speaker of his membership on the Rules 
committee and his ability to determine the rules committee chair.   31
Speaker Cannon’s Ultimate Political Maneuver  
 With a victory at hand, Congressman Norris moved to adjourn. Instead, Speaker Cannon 
asked for the opportunity to read his speech which he had drafted earlier in anticipation of defeat. 
The request was granted, and Cannon preceded to deliver a powerful piece of oratory. Cannon 
acknowledged the new coalition between the insurgent Republicans and Democrats which 
formed the powerful majority necessary to pass the Norris resolution. Then, in a move that sent 
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additional shockwaves through the legislative body, Uncle Joe Cannon offered to entertain a mo-
tion to declare the Speakership vacant, effectively offering to resign as Speaker of the House.   32
 The political calculus in offering to resign was both bold and successful. If the new ma-
jority of insurgent Republicans and Democrats had ever really wanted to oust Cannon entirely, 
this was the opportunity to do so. However, very few members of Congress were actually in fa-
vor of Cannon’s resignation. Overall, the new Congressional majority was content with the out-
come of the revolt and the newly rebalanced Rules committee. The passage of the Norris 
amendment damaged, but did not destroy, Cannon’s political authority as Speaker. Therefore, by 
floating the opportunity to resign, Cannon was able to stymie the hemorrhaging of his political 
career and quell further opposition. The membership of the new iteration of the House Rules 
committee also reflected the majority’s desire to keep the status quo while stripping Cannon of 
his authority. Of the ten members of the new House Rules committee, not a single member of 
Congress was part of the insurgent revolt itself.   33
 Speaker Cannon amassed the greatest concentration of political power ever seen in the 
history of the U.S House of Representatives. The agency Cannon wielded did not advance a spe-
cific legislative agenda, however, it blocked Progressive reform from moving forward. The af-
termath of the 1910 political revolt left the Speaker of the House weaker and with less political 
authority than at any other point in the history of Congress. These events of the 1910 political 
revolt had major consequences which permanently affected the leadership responsibilities and 
opportunities for all future Speakers. First, the office of Speaker of the House was fundamentally 
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less powerful without control of the Rules committee. Second, the reputation of the speakership 
was damaged by the adoption of the Norris resolution. Finally, the 1910 revolt enabled the grad-
ual change the speakership from a tool of the partisan majority towards the original, and less 
powerful, role of general parliamentarian.   34
 The Norris resolution permanently altered the day-to-day responsibilities of the Speaker. 
The House Rules committee was no longer a pawn of the Speaker, and instead was able to exert 
independent agency upon the overall legislative process. Therefore, the speakership was left 
weaker and with less control over the House than prior to the 1910 revolt.  Instead of the Speak35 -
er determining the rules that govern debate on individual resolutions, that authority now lay in 
the hands of the chair of the Rules committee. This allowed for a broader perspective and con-
tributed to the decentralization process Congress experienced during the twentieth century.   36
 In addition to the loss of practical political influence, the speakership also suffered by los-
ing the reputation and prestige it once had as the ultimate Congressional authority. After the Nor-
ris resolution, the Speaker’s authority in closed-door negotiations was diminished.  This left 37
other top Congressional leaders with increased opportunity to exert their own political agendas, 
and engage in leadership which otherwise would not have been possible with a stronger speaker-
ship position. Congress after the Norris resolution saw a greater form of power-sharing and a de-
crease in the concentration of authority once wielded entirely by the House speakership.  38
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 The political endeavors of Uncle Joe Cannon left a significant mark on the speakership 
that fundamentally changed the role and responsibilities of the leader of the House. The manipu-
lation of the Reed Rules to concentrate political authority within the position of Speaker gave 
rise to an era of authoritarian and centralized control with Cannon ruling the House. The authori-
ty Cannon amassed was only shaken by the historic coalition of insurgents within the Republican 
Party who worked with the Democratic representatives to form the majority that ultimately en-
abled passage of the Norris resolution. The 1910 revolt set in motion the historical trend towards 
political decentralization within the House of Representatives that continued to persist through-
out the twentieth century.
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Chapter Three: Crisis Transforms the Speakership    
The Authoritarian Speakership Ends 
 The speakership of the early twentieth century underwent a remarkable transformation 
from the ultimate political authority to the leader of a broad coalition of party leaders who shared 
responsibility. The position of Speaker of the House never again reached the broad and robust 
level of political authority amassed under Joseph Cannon. Instead, in the wake of the 1910 re-
volt, the speakership transformed over the next two decades to become a decentralized political 
apparatus that deferred authority to the president. The speakership partnered with other leaders in 
the political decision-making process to advance the legislative agenda instead of setting the 
agenda unilaterally and making the sole determination over the ultimate passage or failure of leg-
islation. Previously, the speakership exercised a commanding and dominant style of leadership. 
The proliferation of shared responsibility among party leaders, however, diluted the speaker’s 
individual authority during the 1920’s and 1930’s. 
 The speakership transformed into an agent of the executive rather than an independent 
political figure. An example of this deference to the executive branch can be found through ex-
amination of the speakership under John Nance Garner, Henry T. Rainey, Joseph Byrns, and 
William Bankhead. These four speakers spanned from 1931 to 1940, and represent a notable shift 
in the office’s influence. This period of political history included the first “one hundred days” of 
the Roosevelt administration, which was the single greatest period of productive legislative ac-
tivity in American political history. Thousands of bills were passed during this short window of 
time in an effort to restart the American economy in the wake of the Great Depression, including 
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many famed programs to introduce unemployed individuals back into the workforce on a mass 
scale.   1
A Nation In Crisis 
 The Great Depression was one of the most significant historical events of the twentieth 
century and fundamentally changed the relationship between the American government and its 
citizens. Laissez-faire economic policy dominated the 1920s and allowed for the unregulated 
growth of many sections of the economy seemingly without consequence. This Republican-dom-
inated era saw the election of President Herbert Hoover in 1928. President Hoover was a pro-
business Republican who advocated for less government involvement in economic affairs, busi-
ness protectionism through tariffs, and minimal tax relief for the poor. Hoover was severely un-
der-equipped and ultimately unsuccessful in handling the economic crisis in the aftermath of the 
stock market crash in 1929. A combination of a broad variety of factors contributed to the Great 
Depression, including unsound bank practices, land speculation, the proliferation of holding 
companies, an imbalance of foreign trade, high protective tariffs, and the popularity of the in-
stallment plan and new financing credit options. Additionally, agricultural disaster arising from 
poor farming practices contributed to the Great Depression.  2
 The Great Depression ushered in an era of tremendous economic uncertainty and was a 
primary factor which led to sweeping Democratic control of Congress in the election of 1930. 
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John Nance Garner, who previously served as House minority leader, was elevated to the 39th 
Speaker of the House and served from December 7, 1931 to March 4, 1933. Garner was famous-
ly nicknamed “Cactus Jack” as he hailed from the state of Texas where there were many cactus 
plants, and was the leader of the powerful Texas delegation which continued to have the largest 
state influence on Capitol Hill into the second half of the twentieth century. While Garner served 
as speaker, the Democratic Party was split among Northern and Southern divides. The Northern 
Democrats were considerably more progressive and were active in pushing for economic aid for 
the working classes, while the Southern Democrats were economically conservative and favored 
less significant government spending packages. Garner, as a representative from Texas, was the 
leader of the Southern conservative faction within the Democratic Party who advocated for a 
balanced budget as essential to economic recovery and strongly supported agricultural 
programs.  3
 The election of 1930 ushered in a divided government with Herbert Hoover serving the 
last two years of his presidency ideologically opposed to a Democratic Congress which con-
trolled both the House and the Senate. There were distinct divisions within the American popula-
tion, as the Great Depression worsened and deeply affected communities across the country. As 
speaker, “Cactus Jack” presided during a considerably partisan term in which President Hoover 
refused to sign bills passed by Congress into law. The ideological differences regarding a re-
sponse to the Great Depression further exacerbated painful economic upheaval for millions of 
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Americans and prohibited any major or meaningful legislative accomplishments to ameliorate 
the effects of the economic downturn.  4
From Garner to Rainey 
 The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as president in 1932 ended the period of divided 
government, legislative paralysis, and failure to make significant progress to combat the effects 
of the Great Depression. The election of Roosevelt also changed the composition of House lead-
ership. John Nance Garner was elected as Roosevelt’s vice president, and this transfer of execu-
tive positions left the speakership vacant. Henry T. Rainey, who was the House majority leader 
and second-ranking Democrat under Speaker Garner, was selected as speaker to take Garner’s 
place. Rainey was a career politician and a loyal Democratic Party member who had been active 
as a representative from Illinois, and had risen to power as part of the liberal, progressive North-
ern Democratic faction. While the Northern progressive faction of the Democratic Party would 
ultimately grow to command the core of all Democratic support, Rainey was ahead of his time 
and his speakership represented a fleeting moment of progressivism in a Congress dominated by 
Southern Democratic conservatives.  5
 Henry T. Rainey entered Congress in 1903 as a representative from Illinois’ 20th district, 
which encompassed a large part of Southern Illinois adjacent to St. Louis. Rainey was a gregari-
ous and mild-tempered man who was widely respected in Illinois, where he only lost reelection 
once in 1920 before regaining his seat in 1922. Rainey’s political views were highly progressive, 
and included vehement support of progressive taxation and low tariffs. The contest for the speak-
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ership vacated by John Nance Garner was fiercely competitive, and many prominent Democrats 
had selected themselves to be considered for the position. Four prominent Democrats rose to the 
top as the most appealing candidates, including Rainey, Joseph Byrns of Tennessee, John Rankin 
of Mississippi, and William Bankhead of Alabama.  While these four congressman all had signif-
icant political accolades, Thomas Rainey’s success was ensured by the new Democratic members 
of Congress from the 1932 election that predominately consisted of like-minded Northern liber-
als. Rainey was able to successfully secure the speakership after soliciting votes from these new 
members of Congress.  6
 Throughout the history of the American two-party system, there have been acute differ-
ences in the style of organization and composition of leadership between Democratic and Repub-
lican Congressional authorities. The House of Representatives is the largest component of the 
federal legislature, and therefore requires specific rules and procedures to effectively channel 
hundreds of individual opinions into effective policy. Therefore, in addition to the formal com-
mittee system of grouping members of Congress into policy-based and governing-based bodies, 
informal committee structures also exist. These informal groups are subdivisions of the Democ-
ratic and Republican caucuses, which are the collective groups of all Democratic and Republican 
representatives. Notable distinctions have existed between the Democratic and Republican cau-
cuses since the formation of the two-party system, and inform the unique process of determining 
policy in each respective caucus.  7
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 The mode of self-governance is not homogeneous between both American political par-
ties. In fact, key distinctions separate the Republican and Democratic informal committee sys-
tems. One of the largest differences within informal political structures between Democrats and 
Republicans involved the existence of a steering committee. The Republican Party first imple-
mented a steering committee in the late nineteenth century to gather consensus over policies and 
determine the specific methods for passing legislation. There were a flexible number of seats on 
the steering committee and membership traditionally consisted of both senior and less-experi-
enced members of Congress. Overall, the Republican model of a steering committee diffused 
power among a broader spectrum rather than concentrating all decision-making responsibilities 
within formal Congressional leadership positions.  8
 A central component of Rainey’s speakership was the introduction of a steering commit-
tee into Democratic Party politics within the Congressional committee apparatus. In the past, 
House Democrats had never elected to utilize a steering committee. Speaker John Nance Garner 
continued the traditional opposition to the steering committee, and preferred to channel authority 
through a few elite political allies. Garner also disagreed with the notion of a steering committee 
in philosophical terms, because he believed that the diffusion of power would lead to more con-
strained policy positions. Furthermore, Garner held the notion that the decision-making 
process would be less effective and cumbersome with more representatives involved. However, 
the steering committee offered an attractive opportunity for young Democratic representatives to 
influence party policy in ways that would not have been possible previously.  9
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 The prospect of membership on the steering committee was enticing specifically to newly 
elected representatives because of the opportunity the committee presented to quickly ascend the 
political ladder. Traditionally, newly elected freshman members of Congress are required to serve 
on the least influential formal committees and have few positions of responsibility in the leader-
ship structure of either party. There were few positions at the top of the Democratic leadership, 
which translated to limited chances for policy contributions from junior members of Congress. 
Speaker Rainey expanded the opportunity for members of Congress to set the agenda, define pol-
icy outcomes, and ultimately pass legislation through his decision to create a steering committee. 
Overall, the introduction of a Democratic steering committee fundamentally changed the policy-
making status quo from an insular and exclusive business to a broader, more inclusive, and de-
centralized process.  10
Origins of the New Deal 
 The inclusion of a steering committee was far from the only legacy left by Henry T. 
Rainey as speaker. Speaker Rainey presided over the single most productive period of Congres-
sional history during the first “one hundred days” of the Roosevelt administration, which began 
on March 9, 1933.  The first “one hundred days” was a special session of Congress called by 
Roosevelt to ameliorate the most urgent and complex problems facing the American economy in 
the wake of the Great Depression. This special session produced many of the most famous pieces 
of New Deal legislation, including the Emergency Banking Act, the Glass-Steagall Act, and the 
National Industrial Recovery Act.  11
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 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal: 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & 11
Row, 1963), 34-40; Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 153. 
 !47
 Rainey was the primary architect behind the specialized tactics employed to account for 
both the sheer volume of legislation passed and the often controversial content of individual bills 
during the first “one hundred days”. These political tactics included steamrolling legislation 
through Congress by limiting debate and loosening the requirements for a quorum. There are also 
specific cases in which members of Congress voted on legislation without even reading the bill 
itself due to the urgent nature of the American economic crisis during this period. Additionally, 
Rainey was forced to contend with the differing political attitudes of the Democratic Party, which 
were most notably divided into the progressive Northern faction and the conservative Southern 
faction.   12
 The nature of the American economic crisis throughout the Great Depression was so ur-
gent and time-sensitive that many of the most basic congressional practices were completely 
abandoned in an effort to facilitate the immediate passage of essential legislation. One of the 
most extraordinary and nearly unbelievable of these developments was the congressional prac-
tice of voting on bills without a majority of Congress having read the bill itself. Immediately af-
ter taking office, President Roosevelt directed William Wooden, the Secretary of the Treasury, to 
draft emergency banking legislation. Banking legislation was essential because vast numbers of 
private banks had closed in fear of customers demanding the withdrawal of their entire savings, 
which would create mass financial instability. This legislation, known as the Emergency Banking 
Act, provided for government aid to private banking establishments in an effort to encourage 
banks to reopen to reintroducing reserve capital into the economy. This issue was the most press-
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ing concern because the lack of capital meant that millions of Americans were left without the 
money required to buy basic necessities.   13
 The Emergency Banking Act drafted by the Roosevelt administration was quickly for-
warded to Congress, where Speaker Rainey was presented with the challenge of passing the bill 
on March 9, 1933 during first day of the special session of Congress. Rainey himself possessed 
the only available draft of the legislation, which was blanketed in pencil markings that denoted 
last-minute revisions from the Roosevelt administration. Traditionally, every member of Con-
gress was provided a draft of proposed legislation and then provided appropriate time to read 
through the bill to determine their policy position. However, with the crisis looming, there was 
no time to print copies. Instead, Speaker Rainey dictated that the chairman of the House Banking 
and Currency Committee, Henry B. Steagall, hastily read the bill aloud while many members of 
Congress were still finding their seats.  14
 Speaker Rainey purposefully constrained the time allowed to debate the bill in order to 
achieve swift passage. Total debate over the Emergency Banking Act lasted just forty minutes, 
which is considered a record low duration for congressional debate over a bill. The overwhelm-
ing Democratic majority enabled passage on party lines; however, Republican minority leader 
Bertrand H. Snell urged his caucus to support the legislation unanimously. Snell, who himself 
had not even read the bill, appealed to his fellow Republicans that passing the bill without oppo-
sition would send a much-needed message of political unity in dire times. Ultimately, the Emer-
gency Banking Act passed with overwhelming support and without a recorded vote. The fact that 
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the vote was not recorded was a sign of Congress’s overwhelming consensus and confidence in 
passing such a critical piece of legislation. The events leading up to the passage of the Emer-
gency Banking Act are an example of the political trust in the Roosevelt administration and the 
transfer of authority from the speaker and Congress to the president and the executive.  15
 The events of the first “one hundred days” illustrate the deference of authority from the 
speaker and Congress itself to the Roosevelt administration during a period of painful crisis in 
American history. In previous decades, strong-willed speakers, including Joseph Cannon, served 
as discerning gatekeepers to the passage of legislation and often came into direct conflict with 
the policy agenda of the sitting president. However, the pervasive urgency of the interval follow-
ing the American economic disaster limited the independent agency of the speakership under 
Henry Rainey. Instead, the speakership was transformed into a position wholly subservient to the 
executive as necessitated by the pressing concerns facing the nation. The crisis of the Great De-
pression and subsequent government intervention fundamentally altered the power of the speaker 
from a center of sovereign authority to a compliant agent of the president.  
Tumult and Instability Ensues 
 Henry T. Rainey died unexpectedly from a heart attack on August 19, 1934 at the age of 
73. Rainey’s death left the speakership vacant for 4 months and precipitated yet another contest 
for the top post. Joseph W. Byrns of Tennessee, the majority leader, was viewed as the most logi-
cal choice because of his professional experience and close personal ties to Rainey. Additionally, 
Byrns had led the Democratic congressional campaign committee during the 1934 midterm elec-
tions, which added to the significant Democratic House majority. Many new Democratic mem-
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bers of Congress felt indebted to Byrns for his persuasive campaign methods which facilitated 
their own successful elections. However, there was a general hesitation over selecting Byrns 
among the Northern Democratic faction, many of whom expressed concern over ceding the 
speakership back to the Southern Democrats. This inner-party factionalism prevented the selec-
tion of Byrns until the Pennsylvania delegation voted en bloc to select Byrns as part of a com-
promise that placed Northern Democrats as the chairs of the top House committees, including the 
committee on Ways and Means.  16
 Joseph W. Byrns was formally elected the 41st speaker on January 3, 1935, which was 
the first working day of the 74th United States Congress. Known for his reserved and genteel 
demeanor, Byrns was able to continue Rainey’s legacy as a progressive and resume the legisla-
tive agenda of the Roosevelt administration. As with Rainey before him, Byrns continued the era 
of the passive speakership by acting as an agent of the executive rather on his own independent 
legislative authority. The most notable achievement during Byrns tenure as speaker was the pas-
sage of a flurry of legislation collectively known as the Second New Deal.   17
 The Second New Deal was another series of progressive legislation designed to lift the 
United States out of the Great Depression. The effects of the Great Depression still persisted in 
1935, two years after the original New Deal, as evidenced by the fact that 1 in 5 Americans were 
still unemployed. An additional motivation for the Second New Deal came in May 1935, when 
the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional a signature piece of the original New Deal — the 
National Industrial Recovery Act. This second round of legislation included the famous Social 
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Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the introduction of the Works Progress Ad-
ministration. All three pieces of legislation fundamentally altered the social contract between the 
American government and its people and became signature achievements of President 
Roosevelt.  18
 Speaker Byrns implemented similar legislative rules for governing debate with the pur-
pose of passing such detailed and varied legislation efficiently. These rules consisted primarily of 
limiting debate and lowering quorum requirements. Byrns presided over one of the largest De-
mocratic majorities in Congressional history, with 322 House Democrats and 103 House Repub-
licans, which translated to the straightforward passage of Second New Deal legislation. Overall, 
Speaker Byrns represented continuity from Speaker Rainy by deferring political authority to 
President Roosevelt.  19
 Joseph W. Byrns suffered from poor health throughout his tenure as speaker. On the 
morning of June 4, 1936, Byrns suffered a heart attack and died at the age of 66. Byrns became 
one of the shortest-serving speakers of the House at less than two years in total. Following 
Speaker Byrns untimely death, the former majority leader William Bankhead of Alabama be-
came the 42nd speaker after a swift and decisive vote. There was a significant period of 4 months 
when the speakership was vacant after Rainey’s death before Speaker Byrns assumed the role. 
After Byrns death, however, the position was filled on the very same day in June 1936.   20
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 Speaker Bankhead’s election continued the informal arrangement between the Northern 
and Southern Democratic factions to include a Southerner as speaker with high-ranking North-
erners as committee chairs. Bankhead’s personal legislative style was also aligned with Byrns 
before him, as Bankhead lead the House with a gentle and persuasive demeanor. The Democratic 
leadership continued to employ a decentralized agenda-setting model with the steering commit-
tee introduced by Speaker Rainey. Speaker Bankhead also suffered from poor health, and dele-
gated many secondary responsibilities of the speakership to other Democratic House officials. 
There was little change in the overall status quo during Speaker Bankhead’s tenure.   21
 On September 15, 1940, Speaker Bankhead experienced his third heart attack and died. 
Bankhead was the third consecutive speaker to die in office, after Rainey and Byrns. Further-
more, all three former speakers died quite unexpectedly of heart attacks. This era of the speaker-
ship was marked by serious instability caused by quick turnover among speakers of the House. In 
total, there were four different individual speakers in less than a decade beginning in 1932 and 
ending in 1940. This instability dramatically reduced the authority of the speakership as a legisla-
tive actor. Former speakers, including Speaker Reed and Speaker Cannon, developed both re-
spect and successful political strategy only after significant time in office. The agency and leg-
islative influence of the speakership declined without a strong and enduring leader to guide the 
House and direct policy.  22
 The crisis of the Great Depression during the 1930’s coincided with a significant reduc-
tion of the speakership’s legislative authority. The two primary factors which reduced the speak-
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ership’s authority were the poor health and abrupt deaths of Rainy, Byrns, and Bankhead while in 
office, combined with the ongoing  economic crisis which elevated the agency of the Roosevelt 
administration. The economic crisis required an immediate and decisive response, and without 
strong independent leadership in the House, the responsibility to act quickly fell to President 
Roosevelt as the strongest and most competent political leader. Therefore, the speaker became 
subservient to the Roosevelt administration and acted as an agent of the administration rather 
than with independent influence. 
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Chapter Four: Sam Rayburn Commands Authority of the Speakership  
Congressman Sam Rayburn and His Early Career 
 The exceedingly tumultuous era of the speakership during the 1930’s ended with the elec-
tion of Sam Rayburn as the 43rd Speaker of the House on September 16, 1940, following the un-
expected death of William Bankhead. Rayburn continued the well-tread path to the speakership 
through work as an outspoken young representative, followed by chairmanship of the influential 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce committee, and finally service as the House majority leader 
under Speaker Bankhead. The leadership Speaker Rayburn demonstrated served as a model for 
all future congressional leaders and earned Rayburn widespread acclaim from fellow Democrats 
and opposing Republicans alike. The formal responsibilities and informal functions of the mod-
ern speakership have been widely shaped by key precedents set under Speaker Rayburn during 
his leadership as the longest-serving Speaker of the House.   1
 Speaker Rayburn began his political career as a member of the Texas state legislature in 
1907, before a successful campaign to represent Texas’s 4th district in the election of 1912. Im-
mediately upon joining Congress, Rayburn earned acclaim as an outspoken member of the 
Southern faction of the Democratic Party. However, while Rayburn had a clear desire to immedi-
ately assume a leadership position, his lack of political experience and seniority prevented quick 
ascension into the ranks of the Democratic establishment. These factors, combined with the Re-
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publican majority beginning in 1919, prevented Rayburn from participating in significant ac-
complishments during the early part of his political career.   2
 The principle of seniority is a powerful governing force that dictates many Congressional 
operations. During the Republican majority of the 1920’s, Rayburn slowly rose to become the 
ranking minority member of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce committee. Now known as the 
Energy and Commerce committee, it is one of the oldest continuously-operating House commit-
tees and has broad authority over trade regulations, consumer protection, and public health. The 
overwhelming sweep during the 1930 mid-term elections brought Congress under Democratic 
control. Rayburn, as the former ranking member, was promoted to chair of the Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce committee at the start of the new legislative session in 1931.  3
 Rayburn was finally presented with an opportunity for substantial leadership and pro-
ceeded by enacting an unmatched record of legislative accomplishments. As committee chair, 
Rayburn organized passage of major regulatory legislation presented by the Roosevelt adminis-
tration during the New Deal. Two of these most consequential bills were the Securities Act of 
1933 which established the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934, which established the Federal Communications Commission. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission was a government body instituted to prevent another economic disas-
ter by regulating the sale and trade of securities on the stock exchange. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission was established to provide oversight over radio communications, and later ex-
tended to television and satellite broadcasting. Additional legislative accomplishments during 
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Rayburn’s tenure as committee chair include the Railroad Holding Company Act of 1933, the 
Stock Exchange Act of 1934, and the Rural Electrification Administration Act of 1936. This col-
lection of legislation improved government oversight over vital industries and extended the pow-
er of the federal government.  4
 The experience as a committee chair proved invaluable to Rayburn’s political career. 
Rayburn was known as an eager and bold man who disregarded the revered principle of seniority 
on several occasions. When John Nance Garner vacated the speakership to become vice presi-
dent in the Roosevelt administration, Rayburn unsuccessfully attempted to become the next 
speaker by competing with Henry Rainey. This attempt at the speakership was the first of many 
for Rayburn, who vied for the position on three occasions in total before finding success. Ray-
burn also competed for the speakership with Joseph Byrns, and again with William Bankhead. 
These three competitions, while all unsuccessful, were invaluable to advancing Rayburn’s politi-
cal career because Rayburn was rewarded with higher leadership positions after each competi-
tion. Finally, when William Bankhead assumed the speakership in 1936, Rayburn rose to second-
in-command as House majority leader.  5
 The position of House majority leader has changed over time and varied within the con-
text of each Congress. In the 74th and 75th Congresses, Rayburn’s position as House majority 
leader grew more influential because of the ailing health and timid demeanor of Speaker 
Bankhead. While Bankhead was able to exercise the general responsibilities of the speakership, 
there were many duties he did not have the capacity to perform. These tasks subsequently fell to 
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Rayburn, who was eager to exercise his own leadership capabilities, especially corralling votes 
by twisting the arms of difficult members of the Democratic caucus and using persuasive tactics 
to cajole holdouts.  6
 The task of managing votes was especially difficult for Rayburn given the era’s unique 
political environment. In 1936, there were only 89 elected Republicans serving out of 435 total 
members of Congress. Contrary to common belief, this exceptional Democratic majority proved 
considerably more difficult to govern than when the House was more evenly divided between 
Democrats and Republicans. In a closely divided House, there was greater impetus for solidarity 
among members of the same party, in order to form a solid and consistent voting block to enact 
the party’s agenda. However, in the case of the Democratic supermajority, political stratification 
and factionalism became rampant as the diverse ideology among the party became clear. This 
was particularly true of the Democratic Party in the 1930s. A notable example of this dissent was 
the sizable group of conservative Democrats belonging to the Southern faction who worked 
closely with Republicans on agriculture and trade policy. In response, members of the Northern 
progressive Democratic faction called the group of conservative Democrats “Republocrats”. 
These political difficulties were a challenge for Rayburn as House majority leader, and provided 
amble opportunities to gain further political experience.   7
 One additional responsibility of the House majority leader is to oversee all committee 
chairs and act as a policy liaison. As a former committee chair himself, Rayburn excelled at 
managing the committee chairs because of his years spent cultivating personal relationships with 
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various other leaders within the Democratic caucus. Rayburn became adept at governing the 
committee chairs and controlling how legislation was crafted to promote successful policy out-
comes. Overall, the years Rayburn spent as House majority leader further advanced his own 
agenda and solidified his status as next-in-line for the speakership.   8
International Turmoil as Rayburn Assumes the Speakership 
 Speaker Bankhead passed away in office on September 15, 1940. The very next day, Sam 
Rayburn was elected speaker with overwhelming support of the entire Democratic caucus, which 
was a testament to his adroit skills at coalition building and finding party consensus in a frag-
mented political environment. Speaker Rayburn had previously been a champion of domestic 
policy as a loyal and dependable ally of Roosevelt during the New Deal and subsequent Second 
New Deal. However, the political current began to shift in the late 1930s to pressing matters of 
international relations regarding German belligerency and the overall threat of war. The rise of 
Adolf Hitler as the dictator of the German state through his National Socialist Party cast a specter 
of another world war on European soil and fundamentally challenged the global world order. As 
formal declarations of war were announced, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the Re-
public of China became collectively known as the Allied powers, and the U.S declared neutrality. 
Opposing the Allied powers were the nations of Germany, Italy, and Japan, which became known 
as the Axis powers.  9
 Public sentiment regarding the possibility of American involvement in World War II was 
acrimonious, and these firmly-held anti-war opinions were reflected within Congress. In re-
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sponse to increasing sentiments of isolationism and noninterventionism, Congress passed a series 
of Neutrality Acts which legally prohibited American aid to Britain and France as the European 
conflict began to escalate. The Neutrality Acts tied Roosevelt's hands by forcing executive com-
pliance regarding two major points. First, the Neutrality Acts mandated the president comply 
with the official policy of American neutrality without exception. Second, the Neutrality Acts 
required Roosevelt to issue a proclamation of neutrality which placed an embargo on the sale of 
all arms and implements of war.  10
 Roosevelt opposed these prohibitions on American involvement in Europe, and set out to 
systematically dismantle the legislation by calling a special session of Congress to convene on 
September 21, 1939 with the purpose of revising the Neutrality Acts. However, the anti-revision-
ists in Congress constituted a formidable opposition with major American public figures includ-
ing the famed pilot Charles Lindbergh and the celebrated radio priest Father Charles Coughlin 
voicing explicit opposition to revision of the Neutrality Acts, and insisting on American isolation 
from the European war. Despite public discord, Rayburn was able to effectively lean on his De-
mocratic leadership and his deep ties to the Southern, conservative Democratic faction to negoti-
ate a revised neutrality bill. Congress ultimately passed a revised neutrality bill and sent it to 
Roosevelt after six weeks of debate, which was signed into law on November 4, 1939.  11
 The revised Neutrality Act lifted the preexisting arms embargo and allowed European 
powers to order war material from the United States. The key to obtaining the revision was win-
ning support from the Congressional isolationists with an early provision known as cash-and-car-
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ry. The cash-and-carry provision  prohibited foreign powers from buying arms on credit, and in-
stead mandated arms buyers provide full cash payments before the arms supplies left American 
shores. Furthermore, the revised Neutrality Act regulated or required supplies of armaments must 
be transported using foreign vessels instead of delivery via American cargo ships. Although these 
concessions were significant, they were not insurmountable. The revision of the Neutrality Acts 
in 1939 set in motion one of the earliest and most consequential achievements of Speaker Ray-
burn’s political career and cemented his reputation as a powerful legislator.   12
Lend-Lease and American Involvement Abroad  
 President Roosevelt was strongly supportive of Western European democracy and firmly 
believed the United States had a responsibility to provide assistance to Great Britain and France 
in their war effort against Germany. The successful campaign to dismantle the rigid confines of 
the Neutrality Acts was the first step in a larger foreign affairs strategy known as the methods-
short-of-war policy. Adhering to this policy, Roosevelt attempted to provide resources and as-
sistance to the European allies without the United States formally entering the conflict. The sig-
nature component of this policy was the proposal to supply Britain, France, and the Soviet Union 
with armament, food, and integral wartime resources in exchange for leases on military bases 
located in Allied territory. This proposal became known as “lend-lease”, and quickly galvanized 
Congress after the bill’s formal introduction on January 10, 1941.   13
 Speaker Rayburn was tasked with an immense challenge in navigating the successful pas-
sage of the lend-lease legislation in Congress. The political climate during the debate over lend-
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lease was intense and chaotic, with Republicans taking a party-wide stance of opposition  and 
many midwestern Democrats filled with isolationist reservations. Together, these forces would 
have been enough to sink the legislation without powerful leadership and adroit strategy. In addi-
tion, Rayburn quickly realized the legislation would not pass without major compromises to 
Roosevelt’s original proposal. The close professional and personal relationship Rayburn formed 
with Roosevelt facilitated the implementation of political strategy regarding lend-lease and the 
eventual passage of the legislation.   14
 After assessing the political opinions surrounding lend-lease and working closely with his 
Democratic Party leadership, a critical meeting was held in which Speaker Rayburn advocated 
that Roosevelt accept several major revisions to the original proposal in order to make passage 
possible. There were three major compromises that Rayburn encouraged Roosevelt to accept. 
First, Rayburn argued funding should originate from the appropriations committee instead of a 
blank-check authorization. This entailed significantly more Congressional oversight, which 
would ease tension and empower Congress with somewhat more control. Second, Rayburn sug-
gested the inclusion of a two-year time limitation for lend-lease. Rayburn knew the isolationists 
in Congress would not be satisfied without a concrete timeline for the lend-lease policy. Third, 
Rayburn advanced a ban on American naval escorts of lend-lease materials. Roosevelt had want-
ed American naval vessels across the Atlantic Ocean; however, Rayburn and Roosevelt both 
agreed that using American escorts would increase the chances for the United States to engage in 
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the war directly, and likely be drawn into the war.  The isolationists in Congress would be unwill-
ing to permit American military forces extended across the Atlantic.   15
 The changes Rayburn suggested were all swiftly incorporated into a revised draft of the 
lend-lease legislation and submitted to the House. Each revision proved integral to the bill’s suc-
cess, and after three days of debate, the legislation passed on February 8, 1941, with a vote of 
313 to 122. Roosevelt subsequently signed the final version of the bill into law on March 11, 
1941. The Lend-Lease Act was the first of Speaker Rayburn’s many successes due to his political 
cunning and frank governing style. Speaker Rayburn demonstrated independent agency by re-
quiring Roosevelt to accept revisions to enable successful passage of the bill. The close personal 
relationship between Rayburn and Rayburn also contributed to the ultimate passage of the legis-
lation because of the mutual trust they developed through years of working professionally. This 
legislative success elevated the position of the speakership from unstable and anemic to indepen-
dent and authoritative. Furthermore, Speaker Rayburn’s triumph in passing the Lend-Lease Act 
cemented his legacy as a forceful and successful leader who restored the speakership to a posi-
tion of power.  16
 The lend-lease legislation was the first of many bills in which Speaker Rayburn worked 
closely with Roosevelt during the course of the global conflict. The United States became offi-
cially involved in World War II following the surprise attack from the Japanese on American soil 
at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Throughout the war, Rayburn exercised his political mus-
cle to enact the required appropriations and resources to develop American industry during 
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wartime. Together, Rayburn and Roosevelt became close partners during the wartime effort and 
this partnership proved vital to the American victory in World War II.    
 Speaker Rayburn’s first tenure as speaker lasted from 1940 until 1947, when the Republi-
cans took control of the House following the elections of 1946. This was a major personal as 
well as professional setback for Rayburn, who ran uncontested in his primary and donated signif-
icant time to campaigning on behalf of other members of the Democratic caucus. The electoral 
defeat of the Democratic caucus served as a major crossroads, and there was speculation regard-
ing Rayburn’s continued service in Congress or whether he would retire after the Democrats lost 
the majority. Ultimately, Rayburn continued to serve as the leader of the Democratic minority. 
Out of severe frustration, however, Rayburn refused to be called the House Minority Leader, 
which is the traditional title bestowed on the ranking member of the minority party. Instead, 
Rayburn dictated that he be known as simply the “Democratic Leader”. Although downtrodden 
about losing the speakership, Rayburn persevered and effectively harnessed his reduced power as 
a political minority to his best ability.  17
Rayburn’s Return to the Speakership 
 There were two periods in which Rayburn was demoted from the speakership: when the 
Republicans controlled the House from 1947 to 1949, and from 1953 to 1955. During these two 
Congresses, the Republican Joseph W. Martin from the 15th district of Massachusetts served as 
speaker. However, Martin’s tenure as speaker was short-lived and inconsequential. Rayburn re-
turned to serve as speaker for the third and final time starting in the 84th Congress, which began 
on January 5, 1955. However, the same Republican political tide during the 1952 election which 
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had demoted Rayburn to minority leader also elected Dwight D. Eisenhower to office as presi-
dent. Now, Speaker Rayburn no longer enjoyed the luxury of working closely with an ideologi-
cally-aligned Democratic executive. Instead, Eisenhower was famous for employing his as-
sociates and advisors to work with Rayburn, rather than engaging directly with Congress him-
self. The style of governing Eisenhower employed damaged relations with Congress and ulti-
mately led to few landmark legislative successes during Eisenhower’s presidency from 1953 to 
1961.   18
 Speaker Rayburn resumed his former position as speaker with renewed vigor and a 
recognition of the changing political current regarding the nation’s domestic affairs. In particular, 
there was a considerable movement to advance the civil rights of African-Americans through 
federal legislation which would protect the right to vote. Prior to this movement, no federal legis-
lation existed to formally safeguard against voting disenfranchisement for African-Americans. 
The proposal to implementing federal civil rights legislation was 
tremendously significant considering the lack of any preexisting protections.  
 Plans to draft this domestic policy began in early 1956, when a coalition of progressive 
Democrats from the Northern liberal faction of the Democratic Party approached Speaker Ray-
burn about the need for civil rights legislation. There had been growing complaints of disenfran-
chisement among African-Americans living in the South, and the political timing was also oppor-
tune. It was an election year — 1956 —, and these Democratic members of Congress saw a 
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strategic advantage in passing legislation during the spring and subsequently campaign on its 
success during the fall election.   19
 The proposal for federal civil rights legislation forced Rayburn into a major political 
quandary. As speaker, Rayburn was the most powerful member of the Texas delegation, which 
was a core component of the Southern, conservative faction of the Democratic Party. Many of 
the Southern Democrats fundamentally opposed any civil rights legislation to benefit African-
Americans. Furthermore, Rayburn’s Texas constituency ardently opposed civil rights legislation. 
However, Rayburn believed there was a moral urgency and duty to protect African-American 
voting rights, and he engaged his entire political apparatus to support the civil rights legislation.   20
 As the spring of 1956 continued, Southern conservatives in both parties provided signifi-
cant opposition. The Eisenhower administration, although supportive in principle, also stymied 
the legislative process by withholding support for individual measures to be included in the final 
bill. Rayburn and his leadership team determined the best strategy for eventual passage was to 
deliberately wait until the political conditions in the Senate would guarantee swift and immediate 
success of the legislation. Therefore, Rayburn determined the House should wait to pass the leg-
islation until the latest possible point before the August recess of the 84th Congress. Then, work-
ing with Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, the bill would be sent to the Senate the following 
year. This political strategy purposefully extended the time between when the bill passed the 
House and when the Senate took up consideration of the bill in order to ensure its passage.   21
 Hardeman, Rayburn, 411-412. 19
 Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, 300. 20
 Hardeman, Rayburn, 415; Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, 299-301; Peters, The American Speakership, 21
138-140. 
 !66
 Ultimately, the new civil rights legislation successfully passed in the House on July 23, 
1956 by a  vote of 279 to 126. The final version of the bill was divided into three main provi-
sions that worked together to protect the civil rights of African-Americans, with a specific influ-
ence protections related to voting. First, the bill provided for a six-member Civil Rights Com-
mission under executive authority to investigate voting contentions, which were primarily in the 
South. The overall purpose of the Civil Rights Commission was to gather information and for-
malize a final report back to Congress. Second, the bill provided the Attorney General with legal 
tools to enforce the protection of voting rights, including the power to issue injunctions to enti-
ties deemed to obstruct the right to vote. Third, the bill established the office of an Assistant At-
torney General for Civil Rights. This provision facilitated the establishment of the Civil Rights 
Division of the Justice Department later in the same year.   22
 The Senate took the legislation into consideration after it passed the House on July 23rd, 
1956. After a significant debate and final revisions in the Senate, the final bill was titled the Civil 
Rights Act of 1957 and was sent to Eisenhower, who signed the bill into law on September 9, 
1957. Rayburn was an integral component of advancing this legislation and worked through the 
divided government of the 1950’s to enact landmark civil rights legislation.   23
 Speaker Rayburn continued to serve until his death in office on November 16, 1961 at the 
age of 79. Upon his death, Speaker Rayburn became the longest-serving speaker in American 
history, serving a record total of seventeen years in the position. The tenure of the 1930s speakers 
Garner, Rainey, Byrns, and Bankhead had explicitly weakened the role of the speaker and 
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changed the office from a position with autonomous influence over the political process to a sub-
servient agent of the executive. Speaker Rayburn fundamentally redefined the role of the speak-
ership by returning the office to a position of authority and independent political agency.   24
 Rayburn was an intensely skilled and devoted parliamentarian and adept at developing 
and passing vital legislation, including the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 and the Civil Rights Act of 
1957. Throughout his political career, Rayburn demonstrated that building personal relationships 
was key to enacting successful legislation. In particular, the relationship between Speaker Ray-
burn and President Roosevelt reignited the political relevance of the speakership as an integral 
guide to successful passage of critical legislation. From his early beginning as a young con-
gressman from Texas to his tenure as committee chair, majority leader, and speaker, Rayburn 
demonstrated a mastery of the legislative process incomparable to all others. This extreme fluen-
cy in the art of successfully passing legislation elevated the overall agency of the speakership, 
and would serve as a model for all future speakers. 
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Chapter Five: The Speakership Evolves Throughout History 
A Final Overview  
 The American speakership underwent a substantive transformation from a nonpartisan, 
administrative, and parliamentary position to an office of partisan political agency starting in the 
late nineteenth century and continuing up to the present. Concurrently, the speakership experi-
enced a peak in cumulative legislative authority in the early twentieth century. There has since 
been a sharp decline in the political power of the office. While the speakership experienced a re-
duction in total formal power, the office maintained political relevance and continues to operate 
as an essential component of the legislative process.  
 Individual characters who held the position also reshaped the speakership. Each individ-
ual speaker has influenced the increase or decrease in political authority of the office. However, 
several notable speakers have had an especially consequential impact regarding the evolution of 
the speakership. These speakers are Frederick Muhlenburg, Thomas Reed, Joseph Cannon, Hen-
ry Rainey, Joseph Byrns, William Bankhead, and Sam Rayburn.  
 The speakership of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was marked by  its 
formal administrative role in facilitating debate, recording votes, and presiding over the House 
chamber. The first speaker, Frederick Muhlenburg, instituted these responsibilities and estab-
lished a precedent for the speaker as a parliamentarian. Speaker Muhlenburg was especially con-
cerned about finding consensus, and even promoted unanimous voting within Congress. The 
speakership also began as a nonpartisan office absent of any specific policy agenda. Speaker 
Muhlenburg presided without favoring a specific legislative outcome, rather, Muhlenburg advo-
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cated for Congress to reach a common consensus. Overall, Speaker Muhlenburg wielded low 
levels of political authority during the early republic.   1
 The transformation from a parliamentarian speakership to a partisan speakership pro-
gressed slowly until Thomas Reed assumed the speakership  in 1889. Speaker Reed, informally 
known as “Czar Reed”, changed the course of the speakership through the introduction of par-
liamentary reforms known as the Reed Rules. These rules constituted revisions of the guidelines 
which govern debate, methods for introducing legislation, and requirements for the successful 
passage of a bill. Speaker Reed deliberately implemented these reforms to advance a partisan 
agenda and to institute formal majority rule over the House. This marked a critical juncture in the 
evolution of the speakership, as the Reed Rules set a historic precedent for future speakers to 
conduct business in favor of their specific political party.   2
 The Reed Rules introduced under Speaker Reed would serve as a blueprint for the politi-
cal conduct of all future speakers. These revisions would serve the particular partisan interests of 
Speaker Joseph Cannon, who assumed the speakership in 1903. Speaker Cannon, known as “Un-
cle Joe”, was the most authoritarian, disciplined, and powerful speaker in American political his-
tory. Speaker Cannon leveraged his political authority through participation as chair of the House 
rules committee, in addition to his responsibilities as speaker. As chair of the rules committee, 
Cannon dictated in absolute terms what bills, if any, would reach the House floor to be voted on 
by the full chamber. As speaker, Cannon determined all formal debate practices regarding indi-
vidual bills. Together, the combined power as chair of the House rules committee and speaker 
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granted Cannon close to ultimate authority on all legislative matters. Therefore, Speaker Cannon 
was the single most powerful speaker in American history.  3
 The massive collection of political power Speaker Cannon wielded was unsettling to 
many, including fellow Republicans members of Congress and President Theodore Roosevelt. 
After unsuccessfully voicing discontent with the status quo, a bipartisan insurgency developed 
within Congress to strip Cannon of his membership on the House rules committee. This group 
was ultimately successful in what became known as the 1911 revolt. These actions set a historic 
precedent, because the insurgency stripped Cannon of his membership on the rules committee, 
but also prevented all future speakers from any formal committee participation.   4
 The 1911 revolt ended the peak legislative authority the speakership experienced during 
the early twentieth century. Without the ability to serve as both speaker and chair of the rules 
committee, the power of the speakership was significantly reduced. Prior to the revolt, the speak-
er was able to dictate a specific legislative agenda without the need for building broad coalitions 
and finding consensus among the Democratic or Republican Congressional caucuses. After the 
revolt, however, the primary agenda of the speakership turned to building coalitions around 
members of Congress who supported specific legislation. This event dramatically reshaped the 
speakership from a singular, authoritative position to a position of more nuanced leadership cen-
tered around personal relationships rather than sheer political willpower.  
 The next formative transformation of the speakership occurred during the 1930s when the 
political power of the office diminished even further. The combination of two primary factors 
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reduced the agency of the speakership during this era. First, there was rapid transition between 
multiple speakers who served brief tenures. Four speakers served Congress in less than a single 
decade from 1931 to 1940, starting when John Nance Garner left the speakership to become vice 
president in 1933. Following Garner was Henry Rainey, Joseph Byrns, and William Bankhead, 
who all experienced unexpected deaths while in office. This hindered the speakership’s ability to 
lead successfully. Second, the economic emergency of the Great Depression necessitated quick 
action that President Franklin Roosevelt spearheaded rather than an independent Congress. The 
executive proposed legislation, delivered it to Congress for passage, and then returned to the ex-
ecutive to be signed into law. This circumstance, combined with the political instability of many 
speakers serving brief tenures in office, dramatically undermined the independent authority of 
the speakership and further reduced the office’s overall political power.   5
 The speakership underwent a complete transformation from a position of ultimate author-
ity to one of little independent faculty during the beginning of the twentieth century and continu-
ing into the 1930s. This changed once more when Sam Rayburn assumed the speakership begin-
ning in 1940. Rayburn had developed a strong relationship with Roosevelt, and was widely re-
spected by his peers as a man of personality, integrity, and character. Speaker Rayburn realigned 
the speakership back to a position of independent legislative authority once more. This was ac-
complished through his notable strength at building coalitions to pass legislation, and an innate, 
uncanny sense of Congressional operations. Rayburn served sixteen years as speaker, making 
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him the longest-serving speaker in American history, and his tenure was marked by a reestab-
lished Congressional authority within the legislative process.   6
 The major historical changes within the speakership can be viewed through the examina-
tion of separate developmental eras, beginning with Speaker Muhlenburg and ending with 
Speaker Rayburn. Each point in the history of the speakership advanced the office further into 
the political sphere as an agent acting with a specific policy agenda. The American speakership 
transformed from the early speakership with parliamentary and administrative responsibilities to 
the modern speakership with independent and partisan political agency. Furthermore, the most 
powerful form of the speakership existed during the early twentieth century under Speaker Can-
non, who commanded the House of Representatives with absolute dominance. There was a sharp 
decline in authority of the speakership following the consequential political revolt of 1911, fol-
lowed by a resurgence in political power under Speaker Rayburn. These decisive transformations 
within speakership have permanently altered the nature of American politics and continue to res-
onate in the modern era. 
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